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Abstract
Since democratization began in the mid-1980s, Taiwan’s party system 
has been dominated by two parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). However, smaller parties have at 
times played an important role, bringing diversity into the system, stress-
ing different issues and representing neglected communities. These small 
parties tended to be those that split off from the mainstream parties, 
while alternative social movement parties struggled to be electorally 
relevant. The picture changed recently with the rise of two different types 
of movement parties, the New Power Party (NPP) and the Green Party 
Taiwan/Social Democratic Party Alliance (GPT/SDP). In this chapter 
we examine the relationship of these new players with the mainstream 
party, DPP, offering some thoughts on how the relationship affected the 
development of these alternative parties.
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Social movements are generally considered as outsiders in political 
systems. Nevertheless, movement activists can always supplement the 
extra-institutional tactics by participating in party politics to bring their 
issues on to the legislative agenda. In Taiwan, social movements have long 
faced the challenge of how to engage with political society. One option is 
to remain aloof of party politics and just try to influence or lobby political 
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parties from the outside. Nevertheless this runs the risk of losing political 
influence. To switch from street politics to the legislature in Taiwan, there 
are arguably three options for the social activists. Firstly, they can work with 
one of the two established mainstream parties, and it has been particularly 
common to see alliances with the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) (Ho 
2003). An alternative is to work with, or form, social movement-oriented 
parties. Here there are two main options. They can work with a more DPP-
allied movement party such as the New Power Party (NPP) or with parties 
autonomous from the DPP, such as the Green Party Taiwan (GPT).
The Sunflower Movement in 2014 was by far the largest social movement 
since Taiwan’s democratization. It arose not only due to concerns about the 
China factor, but also was a response to what Chiavacci and Grano (in this 
volume’s introduction) call ‘new social anxieties and increasing normative 
diversity.’ After being ignited by the abrupt attempt of passing the Cross-
Strait Service Trade Agreement by the government in the legislature, the 
movement quickly escalated into a mass movement comprising different 
issues, ranging from social justice to labour and environmental politics as 
‘it was a culmination of a long series of contentions and a confluence of 
diverse streams of many CSOs in the past few years’ (Hsu 2017). After the 
Sunflower Movement, the NPP had carried forward the dynamics of the 
movement to participate in the electoral politics of Taiwan. Compared to 
the rookie NPP, the GPT is a veteran in Taiwan politics, existing for more 
than two decades, despite its limited progress in terms of votes and seats. 
As mentioned in the chapter by Chiavacci and Grano as well as the one by 
Grano (in this volume), environmental protection movements have been the 
key social movement involved in Taiwan’s political transition – for example, 
the GPT is a movement party that emerged out of an environmental CSO. 
The cases of NPP and the GPT offer us an excellent chance to contrast the 
development of movement parties in Taiwan.
A number of studies on small parties have theorized about how their 
relationships with mainstream parties can affect their development trajec-
tories (Meguid 2008). Therefore, in this study we examine the relationship 
between two different types of movement parties, the NPP and GPT/SDP1 
with a mainstream party, the DPP, and consider how this relationship has 
affected their recent development.
Since democratization began in the mid-1980s, Taiwan’s party system 
has been dominated by two parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and the DPP. 
1 The Social Democratic Party (SDP) off icially ran in an alliance with the GPT in the 2016 
campaign.
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However, smaller parties have played an important role, bringing diversity 
into the system, stressing different issues and representing neglected com-
munities.2 Taiwan’s smaller parties can be divided into two types. These are 
splinter parties and alternative parties. Splinter parties are those that split 
away from one of the two mainstream parties, often because of disagree-
ments over policy issues or matters of nomination. Lucardie (2000: 176) has 
termed them ‘purifier parties’ that cling ‘to an existing ideology, which it feels 
is diluted or betrayed by one (or more) of the established parties.’3 The classic 
Taiwanese case is the New Party, which was established by KMT defectors 
in 1993 (Fell 2006). These can be distinguished from alternative or niche 
parties that Lucardie (2000: 177) calls ‘prophetic parties,’ which stress new 
issues and ideologies that have been ignored or neglected by the mainstream 
parties.4 Given that many of these alternative parties owe their origins in 
Taiwan’s social movements, Ho and Huang have recently termed them as 
‘movement parties’ (Ho and Huang 2017). The most researched Taiwanese 
party in this category is the GPT, which was established in 1996 (Fell and 
Peng 2016). The NPP and SDP are more recently established examples of 
movement parties.
A key feature in Taiwan’s party system has been that the splinter par-
ties have fared better electorally than the movement parties. Before the 
emergence of the NPP, splinter parties had a far better record in winning 
signif icant numbers of votes and seats, however, they tended to see their 
support levels collapse within one or two electoral cycles. A critical factor in 
explaining the development of smaller parties is in their relationship with 
mainstream parties. In the case of splinter parties, once the mainstream 
parties appear to be returning to party ideology, then the purif ier parties’ 
supporters and politicians may return, often leading to a collapse in the 
purif ier’s electoral base. The decline of the New Party and People First Party 
are good examples of this pattern, losing support as their original party, the 
KMT, appeared to return to more orthodox positions on national identity (Fell 
2005, 2014).5 In contrast, movement parties in Taiwan have struggled to get 
any of their candidates elected at either the local or national level. Rochon has 
proposed that while splinter parties will initially perform better, alternative 
parties would perform better, ‘once they had carved out an electoral niche 
2 For a discussion of the development of Taiwan’s small parties, see Fell (2005, 2014) as well 
as Ho and Huang (2017).
3 Rochon (1985) terms these as ‘challenger parties.’
4 Rochon (1985) calls these ‘mobilizers.’
5 The orthodox stance on national identity refers to a pro-national unif ication position, 
embracing the idea of Chinese national identity.
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for themselves’ (Rochon 1985). At least prior to 2016, Taiwan’s case seemed 
to support the f irst part of Rochon’s argument but not the latter part.
As the f ilm director Wan Jen reminds us in his hilarious cross-Strait 
romantic comedy, It Takes Two to Tango. In other words, we need to consider 
the approaches of both the mainstream and smaller alternative parties in this 
relationship. In a classic study on small parties, particularly the prophetic 
parties, Bonnie Meguid (2008) argues that the best way to understand the 
development of challenger parties is by looking at the strategies of the main-
stream parties. She suggests that mainstream parties can take dismissive, 
accommodative or adversarial strategies towards the prophetic parties’ core 
issues. In other words, when mainstream parties pursue dismissive strategies 
the niche parties’ core issue is likely to decease in salience and its electoral 
support will decline. Where the mainstream party adopts accommodative 
strategies then the issue may rise in salience but because the mainstream party 
may take over issue ownership, it, rather than the niche party, will benefit 
electorally. The ideal scenario for the niche party is where the mainstream 
party takes oppositional or what Meguid (2008) calls ‘adversarial attitudes,’ as 
this will raise niche party issue salience, reinforce niche party issue ownership, 
and she suggests, enhance the small parties’ electoral performance.
Nevertheless Spoon (2011) does remind us that the strategies of small 
parties can also affect their survival. She argues that if such parties can 
reach a balance between their ideals and vote maximization, then small 
parties can survive, even in the ‘most unfavourable’ institutional settings, 
for instance, the Green Party’s victory in Brighton Pavilion in the 2010 UK 
general election. We are thus interested to see whether the small parties’ 
relationship with larger parties can help us to understand the recent fate 
of movement parties in Taiwan. In our selected cases, the NPP adopted a 
much more welcoming strategy to cooperate with the DPP, while the GPT/
SDP maintained distance with the mainstream parties.
To analyse the relationship between mainstream and movement par-
ties, we consider what are the options for small parties in dealing with 
the mainstream parties? How did the different approaches to mainstream 
parties adopted by the NPP and the GPT/SDP lead to different electoral 
fortunes? In the f irst section of this chapter, we will def ine the concept of 
the ‘movement party’ to discuss their major characteristics. Then we will 
consider movement parties by examining the case of two such parties in 
recent years, the NPP and the GPT. In both cases, we analyse the relationship 
between these small parties and the mainstream parties. We also offer 
some thoughts on why these parties adopted such strategies and how the 
relationship affected the development of these alternative parties.
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The Concept of a Movement Party
Sidney Tarrow (2015: 94) denotes that ‘movements frequently give rise to 
parties when movement activists transfer their activism to institutional 
politics.’ The transition of activists from extra-institutional protests to 
institutional party politics often involves the formation of movement parties. 
Since social movements can bring ‘signif icant change in the distribution of 
ideological views among voters,’ Anthony Downs (1957: 115) argues that the 
outbreak of social movements provides a good opportunity for new parties 
to be launched successfully. According to Herbert Kitschelt (2006: 280), 
‘movement parties are coalitions of political activists who emanate from 
social movements and try to apply the organizational and strategic practices 
of social movements in the arena of party competition.’ Representing the 
unrepresented salient issue is the raison d’être of movement parties. They 
are f illing the void left by mainstream parties. In other words, they are 
prophetic parties that stress new issues. Kitschelt (2006: 280-281) further 
lists three general characteristics of movement parties. First of all, they 
often lack a formal organizational structure compared with off ice-seeking 
mainstream parties. Second, they focus on a small set of issues instead of a 
broad political platform. Third, the formation of movement parties does not 
necessarily mark the abandonment of extra-institutional demonstrations 
of the social activists, they can alternatively switch their battlef ield from 
the parliament back to the street.
Movement parties often f ind themselves falling into the dilemma of 
whether they should invest in organizational structure to become more 
mainstream to broaden their support base and, ultimately, increase 
their electoral fortunes or remain as a single-issue party. Developing a 
more general party platform to appeal to more issues could target more 
constituencies, however, it would easily lead to accusations that it has 
become another purely ‘off ice seeking’ mainstream party. Movement 
parties have a rather long history in Taiwan, which could be dated back 
to the Workers’ Party in the 1980s (Ho and Huang 2017). Ho and Huang 
(2017: 344) argue that the electoral victory of NPP in 2016 ‘represents the 
culmination of nearly three decades of effort by civil society activists to 
elect their own representatives, rather than relying on the sponsorship 
of more established politicians.’ Nevertheless, Fell is more cautious, cat-
egorizing the NPP as ‘a hybrid party, with both alternative and splinter 
party features’ (Fell 2016: 58). Therefore, from the perspective of Taiwan’s 
party system, the emergence of NPP is an important case to analyse and 
explain.
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The Emergence of the NPP
The NPP was established in January 2015 following the split of the activists’ 
group the Taiwan Citizen Union (TCU). The TCU was originally formed 
before the Sunflower Movement, with the aim of nominating candidates to 
run in the 2016 parliamentary election in order to ‘break the dominance’ of 
the mainstream parties (TCU 2014). The manifesto of the TCU was signed 
by 35 activists and professionals, including the founding members of the 
later-formed NPP, for instance, Lin Fong-chen, Huang Kuo-chang and Chiu 
Hsien-chih.
On 18 March 2014, the Sunflower Movement broke out and the legislative 
chamber was occupied by activists for over three weeks. Much about the 
NPP, from its personnel to its electoral campaigns, clearly show that the 
party owed its origin to the Sunflower Movement. The NPP leader, Huang 
Kuo-chang, was one of the leaders in the Sunflower Movement. Other 
prominent f igures in the movement, including the charismatic student 
leaders Chen Wei-ting, Wei Yang and Lin Fei-fan, openly endorsed NPP 
candidates in the 2016 Legislative Yuan election by featuring in the NPP’s 
electoral campaigns.6 In the campaigns they never shied away from showing 
their close ties with the Sunflower Movement. An example is the NPP’s party 
list TV ad. This ad opens with the Sunflower slogan ‘Reject the Cross-Strait 
Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA)’ and shows images of Sunflower protests 
as well as the Sunflower occupation itself. Later in the ad their party list 
candidate Jang Show-ling is described as an ‘Anti-CSSTA Fighter’ in the 
campaign.7 In the NPP’s manifesto, it says that ‘We promise to continue to 
be an activist party. Wherever there are injustices, the NPP will be there. 
NPP will always push for reform, f ighting for the people.’8
The Significance of the NPP
In the 2016 Legislative Yuan election, the NPP won three seats in the single-
member district election and two seats in the proportional representation 
6 For example, see Lin Fei-fan’s video advertisement: https://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=SBjF0_d96Og (12 December 2019), and Chen Wei-ting’s endorsement: https://goo.gl/vNMpdM 
(12 December 2019).
7 Advertisement featuring the Sunflower Movement: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v 
=O6p8i5Fx1Gg (12 December 2019).
8 New Power Party, ‘Women de Chengnuo’ (Our promise), https://bit .ly/31il lrW 
(12 December 2019).
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elections.9 These f ive seats made the NPP the third-largest party in the 
parliament. The victory of the NPP also signif ies a change of the political 
landscape in Taiwan. Previously, small parties in Taiwan, for instance, 
the PFP and Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), were purif ier parties (Fell 
2014). Party members broke away from mainstream parties to form the 
new parties. In contrast, the newly formed NPP has many of the attributes 
of a prophetic party (Lucardie 2000). Its candidates did not have previous 
election experience before with mainstream parties and it focused more 
on new issues (Fell 2016: 52). It could be argued that it is the f irst movement 
party to win more than a single parliamentary seat in Taiwan.10 The room 
for small parties in Taiwan under the current legislative electoral system 
is small (Fell 2014). The success of the NPP has at the same time replaced 
the TSU in the parliament and allowed it to overtake the PFP to become 
the third-largest party. The third-largest-party status was reaff irmed by 
the party identif ication surveys conducted by the Election Study Center, 
NCCU. In December 2016 the NPP’s party identif ication was 4.1%, higher 
than the PFP’s 2.3% and one year later there was a slight decline in the NPP’s 
support to 3.8%, compared to the PFP’s 1.3% (ESC 2019). In other words, in 
both seats and support rates, the NPP has become the third party in Taiwan 
ahead of the traditional splinter small parties.
The Ambiguous Relationship with the DPP
The 2014 Sunflower Movement was not merely against the Cross-Strait 
Service Trade Agreement; it was about the underlying quality of democracy. 
Dafydd Fell denotes that from the slogan of Sunflower Movement – ‘Protect 
Democracy, Return the CSSTA’ – the movement was caused by a perception 
of the failure of regular party politics (Fell 2017b). Thus, the movement 
was not only targeting the then governing party, the KMT, but also the 
whole establishment, including the largest opposition party, the DPP. The 
formation of the NPP is the perpetuation of the Sunflower Movement. To 
a certain extent, it intended to keep some distance from the DPP. In its 
manifesto, it states that the alternation of governing party could not solve 
9 NPP won 6.1% of vote in the party list election, see Central Election Commission, http://
engweb.cec.gov.tw/ (12 December 2019).
10 The sole exceptions are the GPT’s one National Assembly seat in 1996 and the Chinese Social 
Democratic Party’s single seat in 1992. The Worker’s Party did hold a seat in the Legislative 
Yuan for over two years but in that case the legislator had been elected for the DPP in 1986 and 
defected mid-term.
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the societal problem in Taiwan, but the formation of the NPP is to break 
the ‘political imagination’ in Taiwan.11 This is in line with the TCU’s aim 
before the Sunflower Movement.
The NPP is a product of the Sunflower Movement and, thus, it theoretically 
and fundamentally distanced itself from the DPP. Nevertheless, the two 
parties did come close to an alliance in the NPP’s initial period. The DPP 
adopted an accommodative approach to the NPP after its foundation. The 
DPP party leader, Tsai Ing-wen, openly welcomed the foundation of the NPP 
by saying that ‘even if the new party [the NPP] does become a competitor of 
the DPP, we [the DPP] will continue to work with these friends and maintain 
a friendly relationship’ (LT 2015a).
The relationship between the NPP and the DPP has often been ambiguous, 
especially when it is compared with another nascent movement party, which 
also split from the TCU, the Social Democratic Party (SDP). The SDP did not 
endorse and cooperate with the DPP during the election. Conversely, the NPP 
adopted a semi-alliance strategy with the DPP. It worked closely with the DPP 
to cooperate on the nomination of candidates. In the three single-member 
districts seats that the NPP won, the DPP did not nominate candidates and 
openly supported the NPP candidates.12 The cooperation between the DPP and 
NPP did not only involve the DPP giving way to the NPP, it also happened the 
other way round. In the New Taipei City (1st District), the founding member 
of the NPP, Feng Kuang-yuan, gave way to a DPP candidate, Lu Sun-ling, in 
order to avoid a DPP-NPP competition within the same district. In the end, 
Lu successfully won the seat in that district (Lin 2015a).
In addition, the NPP also nominated eight ‘token candidates,’ which 
means that they were ‘mission-oriented’ and nominated only for the sake of 
promoting the party list election. Among these candidates, seven out of eight 
‘token candidates’ were nominated in the same district that the DPP had 
nominated candidates, they campaigned for the NPP party list election but 
did not campaign for their own district election (LT 2015b). It is noteworthy 
to point out that some DPP candidates voiced their dissatisfaction towards 
these ‘token candidates’ as they might still get a considerable number of 
votes in the single-member district elections under the party label of the 
NPP even without campaigning. In addition, there was one district where 
there was open tension between the DPP and NPP candidates – in Hsinchu 
City, where the NPP nominated one of its founders, Chiu Hsien-chih, to stand 
11 New Power Party, ‘Women de Chengnuo’ (Our promise), https://bit.ly/31illrW (12 December 2019).
12 They are Freddy Lim in Taipei City Fifth District, Hung Tzu-yung in Taichung Third District 
and Huang Kuo-chang in New Taipei City Twelfth District.
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against the veteran DPP politician Ke Chien-min. However, despite this being 
a traditionally safe KMT district, the DPP’s Ke narrowly came out on top.
The NPP openly endorsed and supported the DPP presidential election 
candidate, Tsai Ing-wen, in the electoral campaign (Fell 2016: 52). Huang, the 
NPP leader, pleaded with voters that ‘although I and Chairlady Tsai are not 
from the same party, our heart is Taiwanese. We both support reform. […] 
Please vote for Chairlady Tsai to save the government! Please vote for me to 
change the parliament!’13 The emphasis of Taiwanese identity highlighted 
the fact that it was a shared value for the DPP and NPP, which allowed 
cooperation between the two parties.
Both parties also jointly formed a united electoral campaign headquarters 
during the elections.14 For instance, a number of DPP politicians, including 
the high-ranking f igure Chen Ju, openly campaigned for Huang. She sup-
ported Huang and claimed that Huang’s NPP represented ‘a progressive 
power’ (Lin 2015c). Moreover, in an NPP PR election ad there is a scene where 
the NPP’s Huang shares a stage with Tsai. The ambiguous relationship is 
clear in the NPP campaign in which the party says: ‘We will gain over half 
seats in parliament, that is, the DPP plus NPP getting a majority. We will 
take responsibility for supervising the DPP ([government]’ (Lin 2015b).
However, the semi-alliance between the NPP and DPP did ultimately 
backfire when it came to the electoral fortunes of the NPP, especially in the 
PR seats. The NPP originally expected to win four or f ive seats on the PR 
list (Ho and Huang 2017). The DPP attempted to adopt an accommodative 
strategy towards the NPP in its own PR list nomination, as it nominated eight 
social movement activists on the PR list to appeal to the social movement 
supporters. Moreover, the DPP, sensing the threat that the NPP posed to its 
PR list, decided to adopt a strategy of highlighting these social movement 
candidates in the f inal weeks. These candidates thus featured heavily in 
both newspaper and TV advertising as election date approached.15 The DPP’s 
accommodative strategy also applied to its issue approach in the campaign. 
For example, Tsai’s advertisements made appeals to core social movement 
themes that the DPP had largely neglected in recent earlier campaigns, 
such as marriage equality and land justice. We will return to this in more 
detail in the section on the GPT.
13 New Power Party, ‘Xieshou Nuli Rang xia Yidai you Weilai’ (Working together for a better 
future), https://bit.ly/35ATruF (12 December 2019).
14 Ibid.
15 For example, see the DPP’s newspaper ads on the front pages of the Liberty Times on 8 and 
9 January 2016.
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Overlapping between the NPP and the DPP
The party platform of the NPP reflects a degree of institutionalization of 
the party. It is far more than a single-issue party. In its party platform, it dis-
cusses nearly every issue in Taiwan and advocates a series of policy reforms, 
ranging from national identity, constitutional reform, to environmental 
politics, multiculturalism and child care. It operates like a mainstream 
catch-all party. In the off icial party introduction, the ‘normalization of 
Taiwan as a nation-state’ is the f irst principle and it is no different to Taiwan 
Independence.16 In other words, the DPP and the NPP hold similar positions 
in support of Taiwan’s independence.
However, the broad spectrum of its party platform actually reflects the 
many facets of the Sunflower Movement. The major activists group during 
the movement, the Democratic Front against the Cross-Strait Service Trade 
Agreement (DFACSSTA), comprised a total of 37 civil society organizations, 
including the feminist group Awakening Foundation, the Taiwan Rural Front 
and the Taiwan Labour Front. This shows the occupation of the Legislative 
Yuan represented far more voices than only opposition to the CSSTA. As a 
product of the Sunflower Movement, the NPP also developed a complete 
and well-rounded party platform. However, this risked the NPP appearing 
to overlap with and too closely resemble the DPP. The distinction between 
the DPP and the NPP was blurred. The DPP could easily adopt an accom-
modative approach to focus on the same issues. As a result, voters would 
f ind it increasingly hard to distinguish between the two and, in the long 
term, the mainstream party would benefit electorally.
The NPP and Other Smaller Parties
Thus far we have mainly focused on the relationship between the NPP 
and the DPP. However, previous studies have also shown that competition 
and cooperation between rival smaller parties can also be critical in their 
development. One such example had been the way the PFP hollowed out 
the NP’s support between 2000 and 2001 (Fell 2017a). One key element in the 
NPP’s success was the way it took an accommodative approach towards the 
TSU’s ownership of the anti-China message. Both parties used such appeals 
in their TV advertisements. For instance, in the NPP’s TV ad we see a protest 
16 New Power Party, ‘Jiben Zhengce Zhuzhang’ (Our policy), https://bit.ly/31g8tD0 
(12 December 2019).
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scene against the meeting between Ma Ying-jeou and Chinese President Xi 
Jinping, while the TSU warned of Taiwan becoming another Hong Kong. 
However, the NPP’s vote share and the collapse of the TSU’s vote share in 
2016 suggests the NPP’s accommodative strategy had allowed it to steal the 
ownership of the issue.
In summary, NPP adopted a semi-alliance approach with the DPP. 
Although there were instances of competition and arguments in the co-
operation, both parties benefitted from the alliance. The NPP became the 
third-largest party in Taiwan and the DPP won historic presidential and 
parliamentary victories in 2016. However, the alliance also made the NPP 
less distinctive and less like as a ‘prophetic party’ compared with the older 
movement party, the GPT.
The Green Party Taiwan (GPT)
Taiwan’s Green Party was established in January 1996. Thus, it can be 
seen as part of the second wave of movement parties following the f irst 
wave, which was dominated by leftist parties (Fell 2005). Although Ho 
argues the GPT was part of the attempt by the environmental movement 
to regain autonomy from the DPP, it also had an ambiguous relationship 
with the party in the GPT’s early history (Ho 2003). For instance, in 1996 
party f igures were divided over whether they should support the DPP’s 
candidate in the f irst direct presidential election. In the GPT’s initial phase, 
despite being largely ignored by the DPP, the mainstream parties did leave 
some scope for the GPT to emerge. The ruling KMT had an openly pro-
nuclear policy and the DPP was showing mixed signals on environmental 
issues (Ho 2003). After the GPT’s promising start in 1996, it failed to make 
a breakthrough in the 1998 local elections. The party then collapsed and 
appeared to have followed the same pattern as the leftist parties of ceasing 
to contest elections.17
The GPT that emerged in the aftermath of the 2008 national elections 
was distinct enough to be seen as a brand-new party. The membership, 
leadership and core issues were quite distinct from its predecessor. In ad-
dition to its emphasis on environmental issues, the party broadened its 
appeal on subjects such as LGBT rights and labour issues. A further key 
change was that it had a much clearer position on keeping a distance from 
its former ally, the DPP. On the back of the party’s new approach it was 
17 For the next few years the GPT at either did not join elections or nominated a token candidate.
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able to develop electorally to move to the brink of becoming Taiwan’s f irst 
relevant alternative party by the eve of the 2016 national elections.
What explains the changed relationship with the DPP? The f irst place 
to start was the experience of the DPP’s f irst time in power (2000-2008). 
There were quite high expectations when the DPP came to power and it 
did appoint a number of key environmentalists into government positions. 
Most notable were Chen’s f irst environmental minister, Edgar Lin, and 
Chang Kuo-long in Chen’s second term. However, in interviews with GPT 
members and supporters there was a high degree of dissatisfaction with the 
DPP government (Fell and Peng 2016: 78). A notable sore point was the DPP’s 
failure to deliver on its anti-nuclear pledges, in particular, the resumption 
of construction of the fourth nuclear power station. It also failed to resolve 
the issue of the nuclear waste disposal site on Lanyu Island.18 The sense of 
betrayal comes through quite strongly in the award-winning documentary 
How Are You, Gongliao? (2004) made by prominent GPT supporter Tsui Shu-
hsin. Increasingly, the DPP was viewed as taking a similar developmentalist 
approach to its predecessor, the KMT. In order to stay in power, the DPP was 
seen as compromising with big business to the detriment of the environment 
and the rights of workers. For example, a number of GPT figures interviewed 
spoke of their frustrating experience while serving on the Environmental 
Impact Assessment Committee (Fell and Peng 2016: 77-78).
We also found a strong sense of anti-DPP sentiment among many GPT 
members and supporters interviewed. This was partly due to similar frustra-
tions from their experiences of DPP rule, but also we found many GPT 
supporters came from families that did not have clear political aff iliations 
or whose parents were Pan Blue supporters. In fact, when we examine the 
GPT’s electoral record and where it nominated, we can see that non-DPP 
voters have made up a signif icant portion of its support base.
One way that we can see the dislike of the DPP was in the case of the Pan 
Han-sheng candidacy in Taipei in 2012. Pan Han-sheng was the closest the 
GPT had to a political star and was standing for election to the legislature 
from Taipei City District 7. In this case an informal agreement was reached 
between Pan and the DPP to allow him to stand with DPP backing. Given that 
this was not the result of a party-to-party agreement, it was a controversial 
case of collaboration. Although the DPP did offer Pan support, some in 
the party opposed him and a rebel DPP candidate did stand. Towards the 
end of 2012, long after the election, a GPT focus group found high levels of 
resentment directed at Pan for the way he handled the campaign. The vast 
18 For a discussion of the anti-nuclear movement, see Grano (2015: 60-91).
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majority of interviewees were critical with only a small number focusing 
on the fact that Pan was the GPT’s top vote getter and helped raise party 
visibility.
When we asked GPT voters it was clear they had a clear preference for 
taking a non-allied positions regarding the mainstream parties. In fact, 
when asked why voters preferred the GPT one of the most common answers 
we found was distaste for mainstream parties. A quote from a previous 
interviewee said that ‘in fact you can’t say the GPT particularly attracts me, 
but that the other parties hold no attraction at all to me’ (Fell and Peng 2017: 
187). We found many younger generation voters were critical of what they 
saw as the repetitive debates over national identity between mainstream 
parties. The inconsistent record of the DPP in supporting environmental 
issues also strengthened GPT supporters’ decision to vote for the GPT.
We can see that the mainstream parties’ strategies towards niche party 
issues favoured the GPT in 2012. The Fukushima accident had raised the 
salience of the nuclear issue and in addition other value shifts benefitted 
the GPT, such as growing support for LGBT rights. The ruling KMT had 
adopted a highly developmental position and was still pushing ahead with 
the fourth nuclear power station (Fell and Peng 2016). The DPP candidate 
in 2012, Tsai Ing-wen, did mention a nuclear-free homeland but it was no 
longer a core member of the anti-nuclear movement. When it came to social 
movement-related issues, the DPP stance corresponded to Meguid’s (2008) 
dismissive approach.
The experience of 2012 meant there would not be a repeat of the Pan 
experiment. In fact, the tensions were so high that Pan ended up establish-
ing a brand-new party, the Trees Party, to contest the 2014 local elections. 
In many ways 2014 was the GPT’s most professional campaign to date. 
One problem was that the party did not contest seats in its traditional 
stronghold of Taipei, leaving this for the Trees Party. The GPT’s desire to 
avoid even the impression of an alliance with the DPP was made clear in 
the case of Yang Zhi-xiang. Yang had been nominated as a GPT candidate 
in the Hsinchu city council election but his nomination was revoked 
partly due to his joining the Taiwan Independence Election Alliance.19 
By the end of the election, the GPT won two seats and had become the 
most signif icant movement party. However, there was trouble brewing 
as rather than joining the GPT, there were moves a foot to create a new 
social movement party (discussed in the previous section), initially known 
as the TCU.
19 See the GPT news release: http://www.greenparty.org.tw/news/20141015/190 (12 December 2019).
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On the surface 2016 should have been the moment that the GPT made 
its great breakthrough at the national level. It was the largest and oldest 
alternative party, with a f ine track record of involvement in a range of 
social movements. With the advent of the Sunflower Movement, there was 
a sense of optimism in the social movement sector. The GPT had made a 
breakthrough at the local level in Taoyuan and Hsinchu in 2014. Moreover, 
the GPT had established an alliance with the newly formed SDP, a party 
that had strong candidates in Taipei. In interviews even on the eve of the 
election there was optimism that the party had a real chance to break 
through the magic 5% required to win party list legislative seats. However, 
when the results were announced, it was the NPP that was celebrating and 
the GPT was left bitterly disappointed. Despite the fact that it had run a 
much better funded and organized campaign than in the past, the GPT was 
only able to increase its vote share from 1.7 to 2.5%. The GPT’s relationship 
with both the mainstream parties and other challenger parties can help 
us to understand this failed breakthrough in 2016.
The KMT (and NP) were even more adversarial on issues related to social 
movements, however, this probably had only limited impact on the GPT 
because the KMT concentrated its attacks on the DPP and the NPP. Similarly, 
both the DPP and NPP attempted to claim ownership of key issue areas 
on which the GPT was campaigning. For instance, both the DPP and NPP 
campaigned for marriage equality, attempting to steal this once GPT-owned 
issue. Thus, to a certain extent, the GPT was not able to benefit from the 
rising salience of its core issues.
We can also measure the relationship through nomination practice. While 
the DPP left the NPP three seats to contest against the KMT, it only gave one 
such seat to the SDP’s Fan Yun, in one of the safest KMT seats in the country. 
The DPP was more willing to offer seats to the PFP or KMT defectors than 
those on the SDP/GPT alliance. We have discussed the way the DPP attempted 
to adopt an accommodative strategy towards the NPP niche issues in the 
f inal weeks of the campaign. This probably had a detrimental effect on 
both movement parties, as their eventual PR list was below what some had 
been expecting. Another way the DPP threatened the GPT was through its 
nomination strategies. It chose to nominate two former GPT co-convenors 
on its PR list and a former GPT National Assembly candidate. They were Yu 
Wan-ju, Chen Man-li and Wang Jung-chang. The damage was more severe 
in the case of Yu, as she had off icially only ceased to be co-convenor in early 
2015.20 In fact, all three featured prominently in DPP newspaper and TV 
20 Yu served as GPT’s co-convenor from March 2012 to March 2015.
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ads in the f inal weeks.21 Thus, we can say that the DPP was using a mix of 
adversarial and accommodative strategies to deal with the GPT.
We can see the antagonistic relations between the GPT and the DPP in 
the case of Fan Yun. Fan was the only SDP/GPT Alliance candidate that 
the DPP did not nominate a candidate to run against and so her coopera-
tion with the DPP was closely scrutinized by GPT members. Her level of 
cooperation was much lower than that seen in the Pan case, but when 
she did appear publically with the DPP’s Tsai Ing-wen, she was subjected 
to harsh criticism from GPT members. After the election, she admitted 
that she had underestimated the cleavage between the DPP and the GPT 
members. Another example is that Fan participated in the DPP candidate 
Ke Chien-ming’s book launch two weeks before the election. Fan claimed 
that she showed up as an audience member. However, GPT and other social 
activists, including Chen Wei-ting, heavily criticized Fan’s cooperation 
with the DPP. The GPT issued a statement to criticize Fan’s behaviour as 
‘incompetent’ and voice their discontent to Fan and the SDP (LT 2016). Once 
again, we can see how the GPT tried to avoid even the slightest impression 
that it was a DPP ally.
Looking back at the 2016 results, what lessons can we draw for the GPT in 
terms of its relationship with other parties? The DPP’s strategy was actually 
very successful as it not only limited the seats of its ally party (NPP) but also 
prevented the emergence of a genuine alternative party in the GPT. What 
of the GPT? Did it make mistakes in its inter-party relations? The failure 
to create either a single united alternative party or at least an electoral 
alliance of the three or four social movement parties played a role. It even 
handled relations with its ally poorly, to the degree that it would not be able 
to recreate the GPT-SDP alliance in 2020. If there had been a single united 
alternative party in 2016, though it might not have won district seats, it 
probably would have performed well enough to win party list seats. During 
the campaign there was clear tension between the NPP and GPT, as they 
fought for a similar set of voters on the party list. Even the presence of the 
small Trees Party undermined the GPT’s fortunes, particularly in the party 
list contest. This could have been avoided if the party had been able to bring 
Pan back into the fold or to establish an alliance. In other words, for the 
GPT the poor relationship with other challenger parties also contributed 
to the failed breakthrough.
Could the GPT have performed better if it had followed the NPP’s model 
of a semi-formal alliance with the DPP? We think this is unlikely for a couple 
21 See e.g. the DPP ad in Liberty Times, 5 January 2016.
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of reasons. The GPT had limited appeal to the DPP as it did not nominate 
strong district candidates and by the eve of the election the DPP was strong 
enough that it could probably have won more seats by offering up fewer 
seats to other parties. It is hard to imagine GPT members and supporters 
accepting such an agreement. In many ways the GPT’s distance from the 
DPP was one of its few clear selling points at a time it was being squeezed 
by the NPP and DPP. Moreover, the way the NPP’s PR vote collapsed also 
reveals the dangers of too close an alliance with a mainstream party.
Conclusion and Future Prospects
In this chapter we have examined the development of two of Taiwan’s 
movement parties with reference to their relationship with mainstream 
parties. We have examined both sides of the relationship. In other words, we 
followed Meguid’s (2008) framework to look at the strategies that mainstream 
parties adopted towards small parties. In addition, we examined the alliance 
strategies adopted by our two case study movement parties. We showed 
that an examination of this two-way relationship can help us to explain 
the development of such movement parties. At least in the short term the 
NPP’s hybrid issue approach, combined with its alliance with the DPP, did 
allow it to break into parliament at the f irst attempt.
An important f inding of our chapter is that in addition to the relationship 
between small and large parties, an important variable is the interrelation-
ship among rival challenger parties. In other words, forming relationships 
between parties is the key to thriving in Taiwan’s party system. As we have 
shown, in 2016 the mutual relationship between the smaller alternative 
parties did have a major effect on their election fortunes. The failure to 
develop a single united movement party, or at least a viable alliance of similar 
parties was critical in the GPT’s failure to capitalize on the momentum 
it had been building since 2012. Without cooperating with mainstream 
parties, will the movement parties be able to coordinate nomination and 
avoid multiple movement party candidates f ighting for the same district? 
Will they be able to develop a system for mutual support for movement 
party candidates to reduce campaigning costs?
We can get some idea from the local elections in 2018. These were naturally 
more straightforward as these were using the MMD electoral system, so 
small parties could potentially win seats without mainstream alliances. 
The DPP had enjoyed historic success at the local level in 2014 and thus it 
was not surprising it lost seats in 2018 to the KMT as a result of widespread 
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disappointment in Tsai’s government. There were large numbers of voters 
unconvinced by either the KMT or the DPP. Nevertheless, there were no 
signs that any of the older splinter parties are able to step back in and take 
advantage, as they continued to lose seats in 2018. Therefore, this was another 
historic window of opportunity for the alternative parties. Compared to 2014 
or 2016, the f ield for movement parties was much more crowded with the 
NPP, GPT, SDP, Labour Party and Taiwan Statebuilding Party all running 
serious campaigns. As the 2018 campaign developed it became clear that 
there were tensions between the main challenger parties, especially between 
the NPP and the others. In the end, the election resulted in signif icant 
numbers of movement party politicians entering local assemblies for the first 
time, with sixteen seats for the NPP, three for the GPT and one for the SDP.
Looking further ahead to national elections in 2020, the challenges for the 
movement parties will show similarities and differences in their inter-party 
relations. If the NPP tries to follow a similar strategy to 2016, it is possible 
voters will punish it in the way they have other parties that allied too closely 
to mainstream parties, as predicted by Rochon. In fact, the movement party 
approach perpetuated since the Sunflower Movement received support 
from voters. However, the more institutionalized and catch-all party-like 
structure of the NPP could easily lose its movement party features. Its 
close ties with the DPP means that it runs the risk of losing autonomy in 
the policies it advocates. Whether the NPP can anchor itself to the party 
system in Taiwan remains to be seen, however, the early success of the NPP 
in the 2016 elections has undoubtedly shown that a semi-alliance strategy 
is a possible way for small parties to thrive under the unfavourable political 
environment in Taiwan. If the NPP does decide to remain in a semi-alliance 
with the DPP, then there should once again be an opportunity for a genuine 
alternative party. Whether this will be the GPT, a new SDP-GPT alliance or 
something else, is still uncertain at the time of writing in the autumn of 2019.
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